Abstract-In this paper, we describe a framework for a refine ment scheme located in a centralized policy server that consists of three components: a knowledge database, a refinement rule set, and a policy repository. The refinement process includes two successive steps: policy transformation and policy composition.
I. INTRODUCTION
It is increasingly important to develop policy refinement that automates high level requirements into low level implementa tion in policy-based system management. T he goal of policy refinement is to generate low level rules so that syntax and semantics can be understood by individual enforcement points.
Policy refinement fills the gap between policy authoring and enforcement. While these two techniques have been studied intensively, only limited work has addressed policy refinement.
In this paper, we propose a framework to automatically transform security policies into implementable and enforceable rules. We introduce a centralized policy server consisting of three components: a knowledge database recording informa tion on the policy domain, a refinement rule set defining rules for policy transformation and composition, and a policy repos itory storing policies written at different levels of specification.
T his systematic approach is able to cope with generic access control policies written in the format proposed in [16]:
{Subject} can (or cannot) {Action} {Target} if {Condition}.
Given the expressiveness of such template, we focus on a subset of stateless access control policies, where action is either permitting or prohibiting a service provided by a target.
Such policies on network services are widely used, like the We propose a generic framework of policy refinement for access control policies (Section II); In Section III, we introduce a logic-based abstract policy language to assist refinement, and define rules for network service policies in Section IV; In Section V, we discuss mechanisms to handle policy updates due to database maintenance. We provide concrete examples on policy refinement in a coalition sce nario with access control list and ROFL [20] , a distributed firewall mechanism implemented using routing techniques, as enforcement mechanisms.
II. SYSTEM OVERVIEW

A. Distributed Policy Scenario
We will work with the policy scenario introduced in [11] for the study of distributed policy analysis and refinement.
Each organization in this scenario owns devices, networks, command centers, sensors and other equipment; each party keeps its organization-specific domain knowledge private; and each organization has its own policy server, which stores policies and performs policy analysis and refinement tasks.
A coalition is formed of US forces, UK forces, and the Red Cross (RX). It is a reasonable assumption that the US and the UK domain have a similar structure. We address the US domain, focusing specifically on two sample policies written in natural language: {Each US device is permitted to access location information from one us location server with high quality, if communication is Before introducing our policy refinement scheme, we de scribe the components and functionalities of a centralized policy server (Figure 1) In the rest of this section, we present a 2-step procedure for constructing a knowledge database: 1) drawing an UML class diagram to describe the structure and components of a policy domain; 2) building a database using logic representation.
C. UML Description
We present a UML description that describes a subset of the US policy domain in Figure 2 . Each class in the UML diagram represents a group of objects stored in the knowledge database.
A class also has properties, such as attributes and methods. For example, the Device class has four attributes named devlD, devName, devType and devLoc automatically inherited by all To facilitate policy representation, we group classes into different zones. Instances from the target zone define tar gets in such policies; those from the subject zone represent subjects. Those two zones coincide in Figure 2 . The action zone describes actions that a target can take. Finally, the association class Condition captures additional constraints on service provision.
D. Domain Knowledge
We construct domain knowledge using logic representation from the UML class diagram defined previously. assType(agg, organization, members, coalition). assType( reg, device, provides, service). The actual relationship between two instances 01 and O2 is described using predicate ass (X, 01, A, O2) that takes instances rather than classes as arguments.
ass(agg, us, members, ita). ass(agg, uk, members, ita). ass( agg, sel, owns, us).
ass(reg, sel, provides, piel).
Unlike other associations, a generalization is defined as isa(C1, C2) between a pair of child class C1 and parent class C2:
isa( sensor, device). isa( stillCam, sensor). isa( senSrv, service). isa(picSrv, senSrv).
Attribute port (i.e. port number) from class service is often determined by other attributes of the same class as follows:
As an example, port number for web service is determined by its security feature such that regular http traffic goes through port 80 and encrypted https traffic goes through port 443.
E. Implementation
We choose Prolog [10] , a popular general purpose logic pro gramming language, for a reference implement of the policy server in Figure 1 . We use an open source implementation called SWI-Prolog [3] together with its plugin ProDT [2] developed for Eclipse [1] .
III. POLICY LANGUAGE
To assist policy refinement, we present a logic-based ab stract language, intended to serve as a generic formal language which multiple policy languages can be translated into and out of during the refinement process. The language grammar writ ten in Backus-Naur Form (BNF) is summarized in Figure 3 . A policy consists of an authorization rule auth, a sign to indicate positive authorization + (permitting a service) and negative authorization -(prohibiting a service). Each auth rule is a tuple (Sub, Perm, Cond) of three fields: Sub is the subject of an authorization policy; Perm is further defined as a tuple (Tar, Srv) that represents a service Srv provided by target Tar; Cond denotes an optional condition field. More specifically, Sub defines that a refined subject Sub' is an object 0 satisfying predicate Exp, where 0 belongs to class C (i.e. obj(O, C) from subject zone satisfying both attribute constraints (C_att) and association constraints (C_ass). Tar and Srv are also defined in a similar way. Quantifier Q appears preceding with Sub, Perm, Tar and Srv for greater expressiveness. Cond is represented as a logic expression on condition element d and cross-field attribute constraints C _cf.
Our language supports compound constraints by defining C _att as an arbitrary propositional composition of constraint 
[ A C_a ttl --> C_a t t n) n ; Q 0 n (n ass n (n X n, n o n, n Ass n, n o n) n element c, including negation (--,) given that op is closed under negation. Each constraint element c compares two sub expressions of form s, where s is either an instance attribute O.Att or a constant a. We also support cross-field attribute constraints C _cf that compares attributes of different fields (i.e., Sub', Tar' and Srv'). The condition C _att is limited to the object and class in the field where they appear.
C _ass defines the association constraints held for an object O. Expression Lc, the basic building block for any compound association constraints, describes a closed relationship be tween two objects that traverse exactly one link (association).
Quantifiers are required for one-to-many or many-to-many associations with scope of the entire expression Lc. Since association name Ass uniquely defines the two end classes, the class definition for 0' is omitted. Notice that Lc contains two optional attribute constraints: C _att appearing before "---+ " further restricts the selection of 0'; whereas C _att' after "---+ " specifies properties held for selected 0'. Thus Lc states that for all objects (or exists one object) 0' associated with object o through Ass with property C _att held, C _att' must also hold for those 0'. Figure 4 depicts the four cases. Shaded nodes represent instances that satisfy ass(X, 0, Ass, 0') with optional attribute constraints C _att on 0'. Underlined nodes are instances further selected by the quantifier. The four cases are able to describe any subset of objects 0' associated with O. L defines an arbitrary propositional composition of Lc, as 0 can be associated with objects through multiple asso ciations. Consider the following C _ass associate constraint [an organization that is a member organization of a coalition C_ass == (3D' (ass(agg, 0, members, 0')
Unlike Lc, Lo is an open link between 0 and 0' that allows 0' to be further associated with other objects in a recursive manner, The last element on a path of consecutive association constraints must be L for C _ass to terminate properly.
Cond is an arbitrary propositional composition of condition element d, excluding negation. Each condition element d is of the form obj (0, C) /I. C _att, where 0 is an instance of class C from the condition zone, like time and location, satisfying attribute constraints C _att.
Authorization policies written in natural language with a constrained lexicon and syntax designed for policy expression can be translated into our language, We assume an auto mated process that accomplishes the translation. Therefore, our policy refinement scheme starts from an authorization policy already written in our language, We translate initial policies .u. .u. isa_trans( C, C') +--isa( C, C') isa_trans(C, C") +--isa(C, C'), isa_trans(C', C") ( 
5)
Similarly, we define transitive closure on predicate obj( 0, C):
Definition 2. In UML, the difference between aggregation and composition is subtle, Aggregation is more like a has-a relationship (also known as weak-aggregation); composition is more like a part-of relationship (also known as strong aggregation). Thus we define the following transitive closure on aggregation and composition associations:
ass_trans(ac, 0, Ass, 0 ' ) +--ass(agg, 0, Ass, 0 ' ), ass_trans(ac, 0, Ass, 0 ' ) +--ass(comp, 0, Ass, 0 ' ).
+--ass(ac, 0, Ass, 0 ' ), ass_trans( ac, 0 ' , Ass', 0 " ). where Ass + Ass' indicates that object 0 is associated with object 0" that traverses an aggregation (weak or strong) link Ass and a path Ass' in sequence, Definition 3. Association provides describing service provi sion is treated as a regular association between services and their providers. We define transitive closure on predicate ass for provides as follows:
ass_trans(reg, T,provides, V) +--ass(reg, T,provides, V). ass_trans(reg, T', provides, V) +--ass (reg, T, provides, V), ass_trans(ac, T, Ass, T'), ass_trans(reg, T,provides, V ' ) +--ass(reg, T,provides, V),
The above definition states that target object T' transitively provides service V if T' is an aggregate of object T and T provides V. Similarly, target object T transitively provides service V' if V' is a part of service object V provided by T.
Definition 4. Let policy be an authorization policy written in the logic-based abstract policy language defined in Section III.
A refinement rule is an expression:
policy == (QsSub, Qp(QTTar, QvSrv), Cond) ± JJ. ref (9) policy' == (Sub', Tar', Srv', Cond') ± that translates higher-level policy policy into a rule policy' at the lowest level through a gradual refinement. Positive and negative authorization signs are preserved automatically. There are many argument values of policy' to satisfy the refinement rule (9) . The selection of policy' is determined by quantifiers Qs ... Qv in the policy expression, and will be discussed in details during the refinement process.
We propose a policy refinement process of two successive phases (see Figure 1 ): 1) A policy transformation phase, that transforms policies written in that logic-based abstract language to tuples by querying the pre-constructed knowledge database using refinement rule (9); 2) A policy composition phase, that composes policy rules at lowest level from query results.
A. Policy Transformation
The implementation of refinement rule (9) consists of six successive steps. It starts with policies written in our abstract language so one can easily adapt it to another policy domain.
1) Permission Refinement:
A permission, i.e., perm(T, V), defines a service V pro vided by a target T. Given the target (Tar) and service (Srv) expressions specified in our logic-based abstract language, we get a set of permissions using rule (lO): 
(lO)
such that, T is an object transitively belonging to target class CT, satisfying attribute constraints C_attT and association constraints C _aSST; V is an object transitively belonging to service class C _attv, satisfying attribute constraints C _attv and association constraints C _assv. Besides, target T transi tively provides service V. Each resulting permission also sat isfies any cross-field constraint specified in C Jf comparing attributes from Tar' and Srv'. The resulting set of permissions are further selected using Eq.(13) based on the quantifiers QT, Qv and their order. As V and ::3 are not cOlmnutative, we have all together six different cases.
2) Subject Refinement:
Subject refinement finds all the subjects S that transitively belong to class C s and satisfy attribute constraints C _atts and association constraints C _asss based on rule (11). 
checkAttConst(S, C_atts), checkAssConst(S, C_asss).
3) Access Refinement:
Access refinement generates a set of access predicates acc( S, perm(T, V)) by computing the Cartesian product of permission set { perm(T, V)} and subject set {sub(S)} using rule (12) . The resulting access predicates must also satisfy cor responding cross-field constraints specified in C Jf. Similarly, the set of accesses are further selected based on the value of Qs, Qp and their order using Eq.(13).
rejAcc(C_cj,Qs, Qp ,acc(S,perm(T, V))) +-perm(T, V), sub(S), (12) checkCFConst(C_cj, acc(S,perm(T, V))).
4) Quantification Refinement:
Let P = {(x,y) : value pairs that make predicate p(X, Y) true by assigning variables X = x and Y = y}. Quantification refinement selects elements from P based on the value of quantifiers Ql and Q2 for X and Y respectively. The order of quantifiers also matters. In Eq. (13), n is a non-deterministic function that returns a maximal set of refined value pairs P' for the initial set of value pairs P given the combination of quantifiers Ql and Q2.1 Notation p.X (p.Y) returns the X (Y) value of an element p.
R(Ql,Q2,P), w here P = {(x,y)} P'=P P' C;;; P 1\ IP'I = 1 P' C;;; 
Given a set of access predicates after quantification refine ment, the goal of granularity refinement is to traverse all the aggregation and composition associations for each field and produce the actual low-level objects that participate in the enforcement of access control. Note that comparing with ass_trans predicate for provides, here we want the low level target Tar' and low level service Srv' directly associated through ass predicate.
rejGran(acc(Sub', perm(Tar', Srv'))) + acc(S,perm(T, V)), ass(reg, Tar', provides, Srv'), ass_trans(ac, Tar' ,_, T), ass_trans( ac, Srv', _, V), ass_trans( ac, Sub', _, S).
6) Condition Refinement:
Since Cond is an arbitrary propositional composltion of
The non-determinism can be restricted by other semantic considerations that select, for example, the most appropriate target to perform a service in the current situation.
is refined to a list of condition instances connected using disjunctions, that belong to condition class C and satisfy at tribute constraints C _att. Logic connectives among condition elements are automatically preserved. Notice that cross-field constraints C _cf have already been refined in previous steps. (17) is one possible refinement of policy (2), saying that UK location server Is3 is prohibited to access picture service pic3 (high quality) provided by US still camera sel at given time timel (gam -5pm).
Cond=.d I
B. Policy Composition
It is often the case that access control tuples generated from the policy transformation phase cannot be directly im plemented because their syntax may not be understood by low-level devices. Thus the goal of policy composition is to generate low-level policies from those tuples. This step is highly language-dependent, because the final output is a set of low-level rules written in a policy language specification determined by the choice of underlying enforcement mecha nism.
So far we have been focusing on network services in
MANETs, therefore we choose the following two mechanisms for enforcement: 1) Access control lists (ACLs) that are maintained locally at each service provider; 2) ROFL scheme that implements packet filtering using routing mechanisms.
1) ACLs:
Local access control lists maintained at servers are composed from results of policy transformation using rule (18) :
where policy' is a refined policy produced by transformation rule (9) , acl(Tar') denotes an access control list on object Tar'. The operation field Act' is defined as a method provided by the object class C of Tar'. This method may take zero or more attributes of Tar' as parameters, such that Act' = C.method(Tar'.Attl, ... , Tar'.Attn), where n 2': 0 and obj(Tar', C). The positive or negative authorization sign is placed in front of Act' to indicate whether certain operation is allowed to performed or not. Alternatively, only positive authorization rules are maintained in ACLs. Hence any oper ation that is not explicitly granted is prohibited. Finally, the condition field Cond' is required only if the implementation support complex ACLs with additional constraints.
As concrete examples, we generate ACLs for refined rules 2) ROFL Scheme:
Now we demonstrate the composition process for rules written as ROFL advertisements. ROFL is based on a simple notion: services -that is, port numbers -should be treated R= {d: slm, S, L, M} where d denotes the target host IP address, s specifies the service provided by that target, m is the destination prefix length (and m :s; 48), S represents a set of authorized subjects, L is a list of traffic labels, with M i= 00 indicating a positive authorization and M = 00 indicating a negative authorization. R is only disseminated to hosts in the subject set S. We have shown that the increase in traffic for routing messages is more than outweighed by the savings by early drops of unwanted traffic.
Generation of ROFL advertisements from refined policy rule is defined in rule (21):
where M = 00 for negative authorization policy. Now let us discuss the mapping for each field in more details.
In rule (21), mapping from target or subject to its IP address is straightforward as IP is an attribute for Tar' or Sub'.
However, it is often the case that a ROFL announcement R
propagates to a set of permitted subjects. Thus it is more efficient to enclose the whole set of subjects in a single announcement to minimize overhead. Therefore, it is possible to implement it as a Bloom filter [8] Gond' is mapped to labels by calling function £( Gond'):
where it is firstly rewritten into a conjunctive normal form by applying distributive property of logical connectives; then each condition object Oi' j' is mapped into a label li' j'. Log ical operator V is automatically implied between consecutive labels, and operator 1\ is replaced by a special label l/\. bits, and each quad is further split into four sub-quads using the remaining 2 bits. Due to the space limitation, we will not further discuss other optimization schemes for label encoding.
As a concrete example, we compose ROFL advertisements from the refinement results obtained previously.
policy' == (sel, lsI, loc3, 0)+ J). ROFL In this section, we focus on how our policy refinement process can cope with policy updates when the knowledge database changes. We will not discuss situations when new initial policies are introduced, as those new policies will go
through the same refinement process as existing ones.
A. Correctness of Knowledge Database
To generate consistent policies, knowledge database D must be conflict-free with the following requirements enforced:
1) The definition of class and associations among classes is self-contained, such that:
2) The definition of instances and associations among them is self-contained, such that:
3) The definition of service instances cannot stay alone without their service providers: if obj(O, G) E D and c lass( G) is from the service zone, then obj (0', G') E D such that c lass( G') is from the target zone, and ass(reg, 0', Ass, 0) E D, where Ass is an association describing service provision.
Standard techniques [17] , [15] for constraint verification and integrity checking on knowledge database can be applied there.
We implement those techniques using logic programming.
B. Update of Knowledge Database
From the system point of view, adding new objects (or classes) or removing existing ones only affects knowledge database not the rest of the policy server ( Figure 1) . Table I sUlmnarizes the changes one needs to perform for operations in the first column, where Y means the modification is mandatory, -implies optional, and N means not required. 
VI. REL AT ED WORK
Early research [4] performs theoretical work on refinement mappings to prove that a lower-level specification correctly implements a higher-level one. Recent studies [5] , [6] , [7] , [9] , [18] address subsets of the problem, such as taking the goal-oriented approach for goal decomposition using Event Calculus, mapping policy objectives to specific configuration details using transformation algorithms, etc. In [12] , some initial work on policy transformation is presented that applies syntactic and algorithmic ideas adapted from the concepts of data integration. In [13] , the same group proposes action decomposition techniques towards a framework for automated distributed refinement of both authorization and obligation policies. Our approach describes a framework systematically for access control policies in general, specifically focusing on network services enforced by authorization policies. We address the needs of policy composition to produce directly enforceable low-level rules through concrete examples. Other related work includes [14] , where harnessing knowledge em bodied in information models and ontologies is used to rep resent relationships between policy components that could indicate potential conflicts between policies.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have described a refinement process for network service policies in a generic policy refinement framework. Future work includes further development to sup port access control policies with complex actions. Moreover, refinement and consistency checking could be interleaved to verify that refined policies are consistent with respect to existing policies. On the other hand, in a fully distributed
scenario, partial refinement may be more desirable with local domain knowledge and a relevant subset of refinement rules.
